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Abstract. The present contribution is mainly intended to illustrate how some recent 
discoveries in the field of neurosciences have revolutionized our ideas about percep-
tion, action and cognition, and how these new neuro-scientific perspectives can shed 
light on the human relationship to art and aesthetics, in the frame of an approach 
known as "experimental aesthetics". Experimental aesthetics addresses the problem of 
artistic images by investigating the brain-body physiological correlates of the aesthetic 
experience and human creativity, providing a perspective that is complementary, and 
not in opposition, to the humanistic one on the arts and the aesthetic.
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In order to understand the meaning of artistic 
products, we have to forget them for a time, to 
turn aside from them and have recourse to the 
ordinary forces and conditions of experience 
that we do not usually regard as aesthetic.
John Dewey, Art as Experience 1
1. INTRODUCTION
Humans are not entirely satisfied with the prosaic relation they 
daily entertain with the world. They are constantly projecting them-
selves towards the Other, towards what is missing, what is else-
where in space and time. If we look at the body as the constitutive 
source of our world experience, concepts like “internal” and “exter-
nal”, “subject” and “object”, become nothing but verbal placeholders 
for the dynamic relation our body entertains with the world. The 
1 Dewey (1934): 4.
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notions of desire and openness to the world are 
other ways of describing the same dynamic body-
world relationship. These notions allude in differ-
ent ways to our constitutive search for a consti-
tutively missing other(ness). Such dissatisfaction 
with the here-and-now of prosaic reality induces 
humans to re-create the world by imagining it, 
representing it, or transfiguring it by creating ultra 
mundane imaginary worlds. Humans can imagine 
hunting wild game, can represent it pictorially on 
the walls of a cave, or fuse some animal’s features 
with those of the human body by creating chi-
merical figures with supernatural powers, like the 
prehistoric ivory statue of the Lion-Man, found in 
Germany in the cave of Hohlenstein-Stadel.
The production of images and their reception 
are specific features of the human species. Why 
do humans produce images? What are the distinc-
tive features making man-made images special? 
What is the relationship between image-making 
and the use of images, their purpose and fruition? 
Is there any privileged perspective to address these 
issues? These and many more questions show how 
problematic is our relation to images. Indeed, the 
“problem of images” and its inherent related ques-
tions accompany human beings since they started 
asking themselves what does it mean being human. 
Different approaches have addressed the prob-
lem of images, almost entirely developed and dis-
cussed within the humanities. The biological sci-
ences and, in particular, cognitive neuroscience, 
recently started to empirically investigate art and 
aesthetics. Neuroscientific approaches to art and 
aesthetics, are usually referred to as “neuroaesthet-
ics”. We owe the notion of neuroaesthetics to the 
pioneering work of Semir Zeki, a prominent neu-
roscientist whose work led to major discoveries on 
vision and the brain (Zeki [1993, 1999]). During 
the last twenty years Zeki has been investigating the 
relationship between vision and art. Following Zeki, 
many neuroscientists started addressing different 
problems related to aesthetics: some used art to 
better understand brain function, employing paint-
ings or movie shots as mere stimuli to investigate 
the neurobiological bases of non art-specific cogni-
tive functions. Others, among which Zeki is still the 
leading figure, employed brain imaging techniques 
like fMRI to study the concepts of “aesthetic pleas-
ure” (Ishizu, Zeki [2013]) or “the sublime and beau-
ty” (Ishizu, Zeki [2011, 2014]). More generally, the 
core interest of this approach is the investigation, 
on the one hand, of the neural mechanisms under-
pinning the perceptual analysis of the formal fea-
tures of art works and of the aesthetic feelings their 
perception generate in beholders, on the other.
In the present contribution I suggest why and 
how neuroscience can investigate our relation-
ship with art and aesthetics, framing this empiri-
cal approach as “experimental aesthetics”. Experi-
mental aesthetics addresses the problem of images 
from a different and complementary perspective 
with respect to neuroaesthetics, by means of the 
scientific investigation of the brain-body physi-
ological correlates of the aesthetic experience we 
make of the outcomes of human creative expres-
sion we now define “art works”. The notion “aes-
thetics” is used here mainly in its bodily account, 
according to its etymology from aisthesis. Aes-
thetics is thus empirically investigated by privileg-
ing the sensorimotor and affective features of our 
experience of perceptual objects.
Of course, these components of aesthetic expe-
rience are just one instantiation of the many levels 
by means of which images can be experienced and 
understood. Experimental aesthetics aims to shed 
new light on the bodily aspects of our reception of 
images.
The problem of art and artistic images can be 
framed as a particular case of the broader problem 
of images qua images. From that follows that neu-
roscience in itself is not sufficient to provide a full 
account of art and artistic images, as they are both 
strongly culturally and historically determined and 
situated (Shiner [2001]). Neuroscience, neverthe-
less, can shed new light on the bodily components 
of the complex manifold we designate as “aesthetic 
experience”.
By means of neuroscience, used as a sort of 
“cognitive archeology”, one can empirically investi-
gate the neurophysiological brain mechanisms that 
make our interactions with the world possible, 
detect possible functional antecedents of our cog-
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nitive skills and measure the socio-cultural influ-
ence exerted by human cultural evolution onto 
the very same cognitive skills. In so doing we can 
explain – and eventually revise – with a new sub-
personal level of description, some of the concepts 
we normally use when referring to intersubjectiv-
ity, aesthetics and art, as well as to the experience 
we make of them.
In the following sections I illustrate how 
recent discoveries of neuroscience revolutionized 
our ideas about perception, action and cogni-
tion and the relationship among them, allowing a 
fresher look – complementary to the humanistic 
approach – at the problem of images. The purpose 
is not to reduce aesthetics to the mere working of 
a bunch of neurons, but to enrich our perspective 
on human nature.
The new model of perception and cognition 
I propose, embodied simulation [Gallese (2003, 
2005, 2014); Gallese, Sinigaglia (2011); Gallese, 
Cuccio (2015)], reveals the constitutive relation-
ship between body and creative expression, show-
ing that human experience – broadly speaking 
– should always be understood as a natural form 
of relational experience. As Siri Hustvedt wrote: 
“Visual art exists only to be seen. It is the silent 
encounter between the viewer, ‘I’, and the object, 
‘it’. That ‘it’, however, is the material trace of 
another human consciousness. […] The painting 
carries within it the residue of an ‘I’ or a ‘you’. In 
art, the meeting between viewer and thing implies 
intersubjectivity. […] The intersubjectivity inher-
ent in looking at art means that it is a personal, 
not impersonal act” (Hustvedt [2005]: xix).
We live in relation with other people, objects 
and landscapes that are present in our real world, 
but we live as well in relation with people, objects 
and landscapes that are part of the imaginary fic-
tional worlds displayed by the arts. Both kinds of 
relationship are rooted in our brain-body system, 
and if we aim to grasp the basis of the complexity 
and the multimodality these relationships entail, 
we have to get back to the brain and body.
The first important contribution of neurosci-
ence to the problem of images is a novel notion of 
visual perception.
2. CHALLENGING VISUAL IMPERIALISM: 
VISION AND MULTIMODALITY
Our vision of the world is far more complex 
than the mere activation of the visual part of the 
brain. Neuroscience has shown that vision is mul-
timodal: it encompasses the activation of motor, 
somatosensory and emotion-related brain net-
works. Motor neurons not only cause movements 
and actions but they also respond to body-related 
visual, tactile and auditory stimuli, mapping the 
space around us, the objects at hand in that very 
same space, and the actions of others. Cortical 
motor networks thus provide the motor represen-
tational content of space, objects and actions.
The space surrounding our body – periper-
sonal space – whose limits are the working limits 
of our arm, is defined by the motor potentialities 
of our body. Premotor neurons controlling the 
movements of the upper arm also respond to tac-
tile stimuli applied to it, to visual stimuli moved 
within the arm’s peripersonal space, or to auditory 
stimuli also originating from the same periper-
sonal space (Fogassi et al. [1996]; Rizzolatti et al. 
[1997]).
Manipulable objects, when observed, are 
mapped by the motor brain as potential targets 
of the interactions we might entertain with them. 
Premotor and parietal “canonical neurons” control 
the grasping and manipulation of objects but also 
respond to their mere observation (Murata et al. 
[1997]; Raos et al. [2006]).
Finally, mirror neurons (Gallese et al. [1996]), 
motor neurons activated during the execution of 
action and its observation performed by someone 
else, map the action of others on the observers’ 
motor representation of the same action2.
Also the human brain is endowed with a 
mechanism directly mapping action percep-
tion and execution, defined “Mirror Mecha-
nism” (MM)3. In humans too the motor brain 
is multimodal. The brain circuits displaying the 
2 For review, see Rizzolatti, Fogassi, Gallese (2001).
3 For review, see Gallese et al. (2004); Gallese (2014); 
Ammaniti, Gallese (2014); Gallese, Cuccio (2015).
44 Vittorio Gallese
MM connect frontal and posterior parietal mul-
timodal motor neurons, most likely analogous 
to macaques’ mirror neurons. These brain cir-
cuits map a given motor content like “reach out”, 
“grasp”, “hold” not only when controlling its per-
formance, but also when perceiving it while being 
performed by someone else, when imitating it, or 
when imagining performing it, in spite of being 
perfectly still. In sum, the cortical motor system 
is not just a mere muscles controller, but integral 
part of our cognitive system (Gallese et al. [2009]).
When acting or imitating someone’s else 
action, the cortico-spinal pathway is activated, 
causing the excitation of muscles and the ensuing 
movements. When instead we observe or imagine 
movements and actions, actual action execution is 
inhibited. The motor system is activated, but not 
in all of its components and not with the same 
intensity as when we actively move our body: 
action is not produced but only simulated.
The embodied simulation of action likely pro-
vides the conditions allowing for the phenomenal 
quality of the experience of imagined or observed 
actions. Embodied simulation thus allows a 
direct apprehension of the relational quality link-
ing space, objects and the actions of others to 
our body. The primordial quality turning space, 
objects and behavior into intentional objects is 
their constitution as the objects of the motor 
intentionality expressed by the motor potentiali-
ties of our body (Gallese [2000]; Gallese, Siniga-
glia [2010]; Gallese [2014a, 2016]).
Further research has demonstrated that other 
types of MMs underpin our capacity to directly 
apprehend the emotions and sensations of oth-
ers, because of a shared representational bodily 
format. When perceiving others expressing dis-
gust, or experiencing touch or pain, some of the 
same brain areas are activated as when we subjec-
tively experience the same emotion or sensation. 
We do not fully experience their qualitative con-
tent, which remains largely opaque to us, howev-
er, embodied simulation enables us to experience 
others as experiencing emotions or sensations we 
know from the inside, as it were.
3. EMBODIED SIMULATION: 
INTERSUBJECTIVITY AS 
INTERCORPOREALITY
The discovery of mirror neurons gives us a 
new empirically founded notion of intersubjectiv-
ity first and foremost conceived as intercorporeal-
ity – the mutual resonance of intentionally mean-
ingful sensorimotor behaviors. Our understanding 
of others as intentional agents does not exclu-
sively depend on language, but also on the rela-
tional nature of action. In many situations we can 
directly grasp the meaning of other people’s basic 
actions thanks to the motor equivalence between 
what others do and what we can do.
Intercorporeality thus becomes the main 
source of the basic knowledge we entertain of 
others. Motor simulation instantiated by neurons 
endowed with the MM is probably the neural cor-
relate of this human faculty, describable in func-
tional terms as «embodied simulation» (Gallese 
[2005, 2014a, 2016]; Gallese, Sinigaglia [2011]). 
The variety of MMs present in our brain, thanks 
to the “intentional attunement” they gener-
ate, allows us to recognize others as other bod-
ily selves, enabling basic forms of intersubjective 
communication and mutual implicit understand-
ing (Gallese [2014a, 2016]).
Embodied simulation provides a unified theo-
retical framework for all of these phenomena. Our 
social interactions become meaningful by means 
of reusing4 our own mental states or processes 
in functionally attributing them to others. In this 
context simulation is conceived of as a non-con-
scious, pre-reflective functional mechanism of the 
brain-body system, whose function is to model 
objects, agents and events. This mechanism can 
be triggered during our interactions with others, 
being plastically modulated by contextual, cogni-
tive and personal identity-related factors.
Embodied simulation is also triggered during 
the experience of spatiality around our body and 
during the contemplation of objects. The function-
al architecture of embodied simulation seems to 
4 For the notion of reuse, see Gallese (2014a, 2016).
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constitute a basic characteristic of our brain, mak-
ing possible our rich and diversified experiences 
of space, objects and other individuals, being at 
the basis of our capacity to empathize with them.
Altogether these results suggest that empathy, 
or at the very least many of its bodily qualities, 
might be underpinned by embodied simulation 
mechanisms. Empathy can be conceived of as the 
consequence of our natural tendency to experi-
ence interpersonal relations first and foremost at 
the implicit level of intercorporeality.
Embodied simulation not only connects us to 
others. It connects us to our world, a world popu-
lated by natural objects, man-made objects and 
other individuals, a world in which most of the 
time we feel at home. The sense we attribute to 
our lived experience of the world is grounded on 
the affective-laden relational quality of our bodily 
action potentialities, enabled by the way they are 
mapped in our brains.
4. EMBODIED SIMULATION AND 
EXPERIMENTAL AESTHETICS
Experimental aesthetics emphasizes the social 
nature of human creative expressions. The very 
same forms of sociality that enabled artistic 
expression are at their basis a further exemplifica-
tion of intersubjectivity conceived of as intercor-
poreality. By addressing human forms of creative 
expression in terms of social performativity exper-
imental aesthetics can fully exploit the heuristic 
value of embodied simulation.
Indeed, embodied simulation can be relevant 
to aesthetic experience in at least two ways: first, 
because of the bodily feelings triggered by art 
works we relate to, by means of the MMs they 
evoke. In such a way, embodied simulation gen-
erates the peculiar seeing-as characterizing our 
aesthetic experience of the images we look at. Sec-
ond, because of the potential intimate relationship 
between the symbol-making gesture and its recep-
tion by beholders, in virtue of the motor represen-
tation that produces the image and, by means of 
simulation, enables its experience [Freedberg, Gal-
lese (2007); see also Gallese, Di Dio (2012); Gal-
lese (2012, 2014 a,b,c); Gallese, Gattara (2015)]. 
When looking at a graphic sign, we unconsciously 
simulate the gesture that has produced it.
Our scientific investigation of experimental 
aesthetics applied to visual arts began with this 
second aspect. We investigated in three distinct 
experiments by means of high density Electroen-
cephalography (EEG) the link between the expres-
sive gesture of the hand and the images those 
gestures produced. We recorded beholders’ brain 
responses to graphic signs like letters, ideograms 
and scribbles, or to abstract art works by Lucio 
Fontana and Franz Kline.
The results of the first study showed that 
observing a letter of the Roman alphabet, a Chi-
nese ideogram or a meaningless scribble, all writ-
ten by hand, activates the beholders’ motor repre-
sentation of their hand (Heiman, Umiltà, Gallese 
[2013]). In the two other studies we demonstrated 
that a similar motor simulation of hand gestures 
is evoked when looking at the cuts on canvas by 
Lucio Fontana (Umiltà et al. [2012]), or at the 
dynamic brushstrokes on canvas by Franz Kline 
(Sbriscia-Fioretti et al. [2013]).
The visible traces of the creative gestures acti-
vate in the observer the specific motor areas 
controlling the execution of the same gestures. 
Beholders’ eyes catch not only information about 
the shape, direction and texture of the cuts or 
strokes; by means of embodied simulation they 
breach into the actual motor expression of the art-
ist when creating the artwork. The sensory-motor 
component of image perception, together with the 
jointly-evoked sensory and emotional reactions, 
allow beholders to feel the artwork in an embod-
ied manner.
A possible criticism to this model could point 
out the supposed passivity of its account of aes-
thetic experience, where beholders seem to be 
relegated to a deterministic empathic receptivity, 
hence losing sight of the peculiar individual qual-
ity of aesthetic experience, largely determined by 
one’s individual taste, background, memories, edu-
cation and expertise.
A second objection frequently raised against 
empathic-mimetic accounts of aesthetic expe-
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rience, consists of opposing the ambiguity and 
under determinacy of art’s symbolic content to 
the supposedly mechanistic quality of empathic 
responses, hence falling short of capturing the 
potential intrinsic ambiguity and polysemic qual-
ity of art works.
I think it is possible to challenge these criti-
cisms by arguing that there is ample proof that 
MMs and embodied simulation are dynamically 
modulated and affected by contingent and idi-
osyncratic factors. Indeed, several studies showed 
that one’s previous experiences, memories and 
expertise strongly determine the intensity of acti-
vation of MMs and the ensuing perceptual con-
tents5 .
Embodied simulation, in virtue of its dia-
chronic plasticity and modulation, might be also 
the vehicle of the projective qualities of our aes-
thetic experience, where our personal and social 
identity, the context, our mood and disposition, 
literally shape the way we relate to a given percep-
tual object. Embodied simulation, if conceived of 
as the dynamic instantiation of our implicit mem-
ories, can relate perceptual objects to beholders 
with specific, unique and historically determined 
quality. I submit that this projective quality of 
embodied simulation can do justice of both objec-
tions.
5. LIBERATED EMBODIED SIMULATION AND 
AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE
As argued in Introduction, being human not 
only means to experience physical reality, but 
also to conceive possible worlds, to surrender to 
imagination and to fictional worlds. An interesting 
topic for neuroscience is to determine how our 
brain-body system enables us to navigate in real 
and fictional worlds, constantly switching among 
them. Embodied simulation, as a new model of 
perception and cognition, also reveals that the 
human experience of man-made images − broad-
ly speaking − should always be understood as a 
5 For recent reviews, see Gallese (2014a, 2016); Ammani-
ti, Gallese (2014); Gallese, Guerra (2015).
natural form of relational experience. We live in 
relation with other people and objects present in 
our real world, but we live as well in relation with 
people and objects that are part of imaginary fic-
tional worlds, which in the course of our cultural 
history we came to identify as art. Both kinds of 
relationship are rooted in our brain-body system. 
The very same forms of sociality enabling artis-
tic expressions and their reception are, at their 
basis, a further exemplification of intersubjectiv-
ity, conceived of as intercorporeality. Neuroscience 
allows us to understand how the line between 
what we call reality and the imaginary and imag-
ined worlds of fiction is much less sharp and 
clear than one might think. Indeed, experienc-
ing an emotion and imagining it are both under-
pinned by the activation of partly identical brain 
circuits, although differently connected in these 
two different cognitive and phenomenal situa-
tions. Similarly, to see something and to imagine 
it, to act and imagining to act, share the activation 
of partly common brain circuits. A recent high-
density EEG study showed that the brain circuits 
that inhibit action execution are partly the same 
that allow us to imagine to act (Angelini et al. 
[2015]). All these examples of dual activation pat-
tern of the same brain circuits represent a further 
expression of embodied simulation and the related 
notion of neural reuse (Gallese [2014a, 2016]).
A further advantage of embodied simulation 
consists in the possibility to address human forms 
of creative expression in terms of social perform-
ativity. Indeed, the bio-cultural approach to the 
naturalization of art and aesthetics, heavily influ-
enced by cultural anthropology, emphasizes the 
performative character of human creativity. The 
anthropologist Tim Ingold wrote: «Hunters and 
gatherers of the past were painting and carving, 
but they were not “producing art”. […] We must 
cease thinking of painting and carving as modali-
ties of the production of art, and view art instead 
as one rather peculiar, and historically very spe-
cific objectification of the activities of painting and 
carving» (Ingold [2000]: 131).
Similarly, Ellen Dissanayake wrote: “Art is not 
an ornamental and dispensable luxury, but intrin-
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sic to our species. […] Art as a behavioral com-
plex is an inherited tendency to act in a certain 
way, given appropriate circumstances” (Dissanay-
ake [1992]: 224).
Embodied simulation is congruent with this 
approach and can be relevant to shed new light 
on aesthetic experience in at least two ways: first, 
because of the bodily feelings triggered by the out-
comes of human symbolic expression, by means 
of the embodied simulation they evoke. In such a 
way, embodied simulation generates the peculiar 
seeing-as characterizing our aesthetic experience 
of the images we look at. Second, because of the 
intimate relationship between the creative gesture 
and its reception by beholders, in virtue of the 
motor representation that produces the image and, 
by means of simulation, enables its experience 
[Freedberg, Gallese (2007); see also Gallese, Di 
Dio (2012); Gallese (2012, 2014b); Gallese, Gattara 
(2015)].
However, there is a clear distinction between 
our experience of the real world and our experi-
ence of the worlds of fiction. Our relationship 
with fictional worlds is double-edged: on the 
one hand we pretend them to be true, while, on 
the other, we are fully aware they are not. When 
beholding a painting at an art museum, for exam-
ple, several powerful framing effects take place. 
First, we find ourselves in a context where the 
images hanging on the wall are supposedly art 
works. Second, once we let the art work capture 
our attention, the frame surrounding it almost 
disappears, as we are fully absorbed by the image.
In spite of the fact that the body is at the core 
of our perceptions, of our understanding, and of 
our imagination, the relationship with fictional 
worlds is still mainly explained in purely cogni-
tive terms, that is, following Coleridge, in terms 
of «suspension of disbelief». This explanation, 
however, is at best partial. It was proposed that 
embodied simulation can be relevant to our expe-
rience of fictional worlds because of the feeling of 
body they evoke by means of the potentiation of 
the mirroring mechanisms they activate [Wojcie-
howski, Gallese (2011); see also Gallese (2011, 
2012, 2014b); Gallese, Guerra (2015)]. In such a 
way, embodied simulation generates the specific 
attitude informing our aesthetic experience. Such 
potentiation supposedly boosts the bodily memo-
ries and imaginative associations fictional content 
can awake in our minds, thus providing the idi-
osyncratic character of its appreciation.
How is such potentiation achieved? One 
important context-dependent aspect characteriz-
ing our relationship to fictional worlds deals with 
our distancing from the unrelated external world, 
which remains at the periphery of our attention-
al focus, very much like the frames surrounding 
the images we are beholding. According to my 
hypothesis, such distancing, this temporary sus-
pension of the active grip on our daily occupa-
tions, liberates new simulative energies. Our expe-
rience of fictional worlds, besides being a suspen-
sion of disbelief, can thus be interpreted as a sort 
of “liberated embodied simulation”. When adopt-
ing such aesthetic attitude, our embodied simula-
tion becomes liberated, that is, it is freed from the 
burden of modeling our actual presence in daily 
life (Gallese [2011, 2012]; Wojciehowski, Gal-
lese [2011]; Gallese, Guerra [2015]). Through an 
immersive state in which our attention is focused 
on the fictional world, we can fully deploy our 
simulative resources, letting our defensive guard 
against daily reality slip for a while.
Finally, I posit that when engaged with fic-
tional worlds, the contextual bodily framing − our 
being still − additionally boosts our embodied 
simulation. Our being still simultaneously enables 
us to fully deploy our simulative resources at the 
service of the immersive relationship with the fic-
tional world, thus generating an even greater feel-
ing of body. Being forced to inaction, we are more 
open to feelings and emotions. The specific and 
particularly moving experience generated when 
immersed in fictional worlds is thus likely also 
driven by this sense of safe intimacy with a world 
we not only imagine, but also literally embody.
When we relate to fictional worlds, our atti-
tude towards their content can be character-
ized as a sort of “neotenic look”, in a way similar 
to the way we were looking at the world during 
that early period of our development, in which, 
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because of our poor motor autonomy, our interac-
tions with the world were mainly mediated by the 
embodied simulation of events, actions, and emo-
tions animating our social landscape. Probably we 
learn to calibrate gestures and expressions and to 
match them with experiences of pleasure/displeas-
ure observing them in others, thanks to embodied 
simulation and its plasticity.
When we relate to fictional worlds, like when 
contemplating art, our relative immobility is not 
anymore the consequence of the immaturity of our 
sensorimotor development, but the outcome of our 
deliberate decision. However, immobility, that is, a 
greater degree of motor inhibition, probably allows 
us to allocate more neural resources, intensifying 
the activation of bodily-formatted representations, 
and in so doing, making us adhere more intensely 
to what we are simulating. Perhaps it is no coinci-
dence that some of the most vivid fictional expe-
riences we entertain, as those occurring during 
dreaming activity, are paralleled by massive inhibi-
tion of the muscle tone in our body.
During the aesthetic experience of fictional 
worlds, our experience is almost exclusively medi-
ated by a simulative perception of the events, 
actions and emotions representing the content of 
fiction. For example, when watching a movie or 
reading a novel, we not only focus our attention 
on them, but our immobility enables us to fully 
deploy our embodied simulation resources and 
put them at the service of our immersive relation-
ship with the story. This hypothesis can plausibly 
contribute to explain the difference between our 
“aesthetic attitude” towards fictional worlds and 
our ordinary consciousness of prosaic reality.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The creative expressive processes character-
izing our species, in spite of their progressive 
abstraction and externalization from the body, 
keep their bodily ties intact. Creative expression 
through image-making is tied to the body not 
only because the body is the image-making instru-
ment, but also because it is the main medium 
allowing the experience of man-made images.
We can now look at the aesthetic-symbolic 
dimension of humans not only from a semiotic-
hermeneutic perspective, but starting from the 
dimension of bodily presence. According to Hans 
Gumbrecht (2004), aesthetic experience involves 
two components: one deals with meaning, the 
other one with presence. The notion of presence 
entails the bodily involvement of image behold-
ers through a synesthetic multimodal relationship 
with the artistic/cultural artifact, whose percep-
tion is qualified by Gumbrecht as «haptic vision». 
According to Gumbrecht every culture can be 
analyzed and studied from the double perspec-
tive of meaning and presence, because both can 
be found in variable percentage in every cultur-
al object. When presence predominates, world 
objects chiefly acquire their sense in virtue of their 
intrinsic sensorimotor inherence to perceivers, 
and not through interpretation.
The added value experimental aesthetics can 
bring to the debate in aesthetics consists in revital-
izing the scientific study of artistic styles, focusing 
on their biological bodily roots. With the project 
of naturalizing aesthetic experience the outcomes 
of human creative expression can be viewed and 
interpreted in ways less conditioned by contempo-
rary western cultural and aesthetic canon, because 
such influences can be specifically studied, thus 
granting their thorough understanding.
Contemporary neuroscience shows that what 
we see is not the simple “visual” recording in our 
brain of what stands in front of our eyes, but the 
result of a complex construction whose outcome 
is the result of the fundamental contribution of 
our body with its motor potentialities, our senses 
and emotions, our imagination and our memories. 
We must definitely abandon the outdated concept 
of solipsistic and “purely-visibilist” vision. Vision 
is a complex experience, intrinsically synesthetic, 
that is, made of attributes that largely exceed the 
mere transposition in visual coordinates of what 
we experience any time we lay our eyes on some-
thing. The expression “laying the eyes” indeed 
betrays the haptic quality of vision: our eyes are 
not just optical instruments, but also a “hand” 
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touching and exploring the visible, turning it into 
something seen by someone.
With the aid of neuroscience we can better test 
the supposed universality of human artistic expres-
sion and, most importantly, challenge its allegedly 
unique logocentric origin. Cognitive neuroscience 
can surrender us from the forced choice between 
the totalizing relativism of social constructivism, 
which doesn’t leave any room to the constitutive 
role of the body in cognition, and the determinis-
tic scientism of some quarters of evolutionary psy-
chology, which aims at explaining art exclusively in 
terms of adaptation and modularity.
Experimental aesthetics can shed new light 
– from its own peculiar perspective and method-
ology – on the aesthetic quality of human nature 
and its natural creative inclination. In so doing 
it will help us understanding why and how crea-
tive expression and what we now designate as art 
are among the most fundamental expressions of 
human nature6.
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